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International outsourcing and the productivity of low-skilled
labor in the EU
Abstract
This article presents first insights into the role of international outsourcing on the productivity of
low-skilled workers in EU manufacturing. Whereas in the short run international outsourcing exhibits a
negative marginal effect on real value added per low-skilled worker, the long-run parameter estimates
reveal a positive impact. This may be explained by imperfections in European labor and goods markets,
which prohibit an immediate adjustment in the factor employment and the output structure. The change
in the outsourcing intensity since 1993 alone acounts for a long-run increase of about 6.0% in the real
value added per low-skilled worker.
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International Outsourcing and the Productivity of Low-skilled
Labor in the EU
This paper presents Þrst insights into the role of international outsourcing on
the productivity of low-skilled workers in EU manufacturing. Whereas in the
short run international outsourcing exhibits a negative marginal eﬀect on real
value added per low-skilled worker, the long-run parameter estimates reveal
a positive impact. This may be explained by imperfections in European
labor and goods markets, which prohibit an immediate adjustment in the
factor employment and the output structure. The change in the outsourcing
intensity since 1993 alone acounts for a long-run increase of about 6.0% in
the real value added per low-skilled worker.
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I INTRODUCTION1
In recent years, international outsourcing (international fragmentation of the
value added chain) has become one of the core interests in international eco-
nomics and it is now seen as an important source of the observed change
in factor productivity and factor rewards in the recent past (see Feenstra
& Hanson, 1999). However, from a theoretical point of view the impact
on factor productivity and factor rewards is not clear-cut but critically de-
pends on which factors are substituted by the international fragmentation of
production, which sectors are engaged in international outsourcing and the
intersectoral and international mobility of factors.2 In addition, factor and
product market imperfections aﬀect the outcome (at least in the short-run).
Empirical research has predominantly been concerned with the eﬀects
of outsourcing on the US labor market (Siegel & Griliches, 1991; Feenstra
& Hanson, 1999; Slaughter, 2000; etc.). Research on the importance for
European economies has predominantly concentrated on the eﬀects of trade
with less developed countries on labor markets rather than focussing on direct
measures of outsourcing (Hine & Wright, 1998; Anderton & Brenton, 1999;
Greenaway et al., 1999; Greenaway et al. 2000; etc.).3
This paper combines trade statistics for intermediate goods imports and
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information from Input-Output tables to construct a conceptually narrow
measure of outsourcing (i.e., intermediate goods imports from the same in-
dustry4) in order to investigate its eﬀect on the productivity of low-skilled
labor. Due to the lack of skill-speciÞc wages at the industry level of the Eu-
ropean Union member countries, this has to be done in a primary production
function approach. We choose a nested CES framework, which is suﬃciently
ßexible (see Perroni & Rutherford, 1995) and less demanding than other
ßexible functional forms in terms of the parameters to be estimated. To in-
vestigate the robustness of our Þndings we additionally estimate a translog
speciÞcation.5
Interestingly, in the nonlinear CES framework we Þnd a Hicks non-neutral,
augmenting eﬀect of outsourcing on physical capital and high-skilled labor
(both relative to low-skilled labor) of approximately the same size. In the
short-run, outsourcing exhibits a negative eﬀect on real value added per low-
skilled worker. This might be caused by imperfections on factor and product
markets. In the long-run, outsourcing increases real value added per low-
skilled employee. The average annual change in the outsourcing to output
ratio in EU manufacturing amounted to 3.2%. According to our simulations,
the observed change in EU outsourcing since 1993 alone accounts for a long-
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run eﬀect of about 6.0% of the observed change in the real value added per
low-skilled worker.
II THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In general, the value added of industry i is given by
Yi −
X
j 6=i
Dji −
nX
j=1
Oji = Qi (Vi) , (1)
where Yi is the real value of commodity i produced in industry i, D
j
i is the
real value of domestically sourced intermediate good j and Oji describes the
real value of the imported intermediate good j employed in the production of
industry i. Below, we focus on the role of Oji . Qi is the value added produced
at home with a vector of input factors Vi. For notational simplicity, we omit
time and country indices in the theoretical part of the paper. Using a CES -
speciÞcation for the production of Qi, gives6
Qi = Ai
©
δK∗−ρi + (1− δ)L∗−ρi
ª−r/ρ
, (2)
where Ai subsumes information about the level of technology, the degree of
competition and the level of outsourcing activities.7 δ and (1 − δ) are the
weights of eﬃciency units of capital and labor in the production process. r
indicates the degree of scale economies in the production of the value added.
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K∗ and L∗ denote levels of eﬃciency units of capital and labor. We de-
Þne K∗i ≡ aK (Oi)Ki, where aK (Oi) is an eﬃciency measure and Ki is the
capital input used in industry i.8 By allowing for two types of labor, we
deÞne L∗i ≡ aH (Oi)Hi + aL (Oi)Li, where aH (Oi) and aL (Oi) are again
eﬃciency measures and Hi and Li denote the amount of high-skilled and
low-skilled labor employed in industry i, respectively.9 aK (Oi), aH (Oi) and
aL (Oi) depend on the intensity of outsourcing of industry i (Oi), where
Oi ≡
nP
j=1
Oji /Yi. This assumption can be justiÞed in the following way. First,
outsourcing decisions themselves may be driven by specialization eﬀects, pos-
sibly increasing the factor productivity in diﬀerent ways (see the discussion
in Burda & Dluhosch, 1998). Second, if production processes diﬀer in terms
of factor productivity, outsourcing of some production stages in general im-
plies changes in the productivity of home-supplied production factors K, H
and L (see Arndt, 1997). Finally, international outsourcing may also alter
the degree of substitutability of factors in the production process, which is
taken into account by allowing eﬃciency measures aK , aH and aL to depend
in diﬀerent ways on Oi.
For our empirical analysis, we have to specify Ai, aK (Oi) , aH (Oi) and
aL (Oi) . In the following, we assume Ai ≡ Aeϑi+γ Oi, aK (Oi) ≡ eβK Oi ,
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aH (Oi) ≡ eβH Oi and aL (Oi) ≡ eβLOi .10 After inserting, (2) can be rewritten
as
Qi = Ae
ϑ+γOi
n
δ
£
Kie
βKOi
¤−ρ
+ (1− δ) £HieβHOi + LieβLOi¤−ρo−r/ρ . (3)
This closes the theoretical discussion. In the empirical analysis, we focus on
estimating the impact of international outsourcing on the average product
of low-skilled labor qi ≡ Qi/Li for diﬀerent industries of the EU-member
countries.
III DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We use data from New Cronos (EUROSTAT) on education, employment,
real value added and real gross production with 1996 as the base year. Ad-
ditionally, investment-to-value-added ratios come from STAN (OECD). The
construction of our narrow outsourcing measure requires data from the EU
Input-Output tables (EUROSTAT) together with intermediate goods trade
Þgures fromUnited Nations. We use data for 21 NACE 2-digit manufacturing
industries in 12 EU members (EU-15 without the joining countries of 1995)
for the period 1993-1997 at constant prices and US dollars. This database
does neither provide information on skill-speciÞc wages nor on R&D and the
use of computers at the required level of aggregation and the countries under
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consideration. However, any impact identical for all countries and industries
can be captured by Þxed time eﬀects. Also, the panel is relatively short and
the variance of these variables over the covered six years is likely small. A
time-invariant, country-speciÞc eﬀect of these variables can be accounted for
by the inclusion of Þxed country eﬀects. Finally a time-invariant, industry-
speciÞc impact can be controlled for by the inclusion of Þxed industry eﬀects.
New Cronos provides information on the number of workers with a min-
imum of upper secondary education. We use this share of workers relative
to the other ones as a measure of the high-skilled to low-skilled labor ratio
(H/L) at the industry level. We cannot account for hours worked, since the
required data are not available for all countries and industries under consid-
eration. However, as long as the hours worked are not speciÞc to factors and
constant over time, they can be captured by the Þxed country and industry
eﬀects.
Leamer (1984) suggests to approximate capital stock data by the perpet-
ual inventory method. Industry gross Þxed capital formation is constructed
by the use of investment-to-value-added ratios at ISIC together with real
value added from New Cronos at NACE. We follow Keller (2000) in the per-
petual inventory construction of the time (t), country (c) and industry (i)
8
speciÞc capital stock:
K1986,ic = 1/4 · (I1986,ic + I1987,ic + I1988,ic + I1989,ic)/(gic + δ) (4)
Kt>1986 = (1− δ)Kt−1,ic + Itic,
with K denoting real capital stocks, I is real gross Þxed capital formation
(assuming that the nominal investment-to-value-added ratio corresponds to
the real one), g is the real average annual growth of industry speciÞc invest-
ment between 1986 and 1997, and δ is the depreciation rate. As suggested by
Hofer et al. (1997), the latter is assumed at 10% for each industry, country
and year.11
Following Feenstra and Hanson (1999), we use a narrow measure of out-
sourcing (Otic), which is deÞned as
Otic = DicMtic/Ytic, (5)
with Dic as the diagonal of the NACE 2-digit Input-Output tables as a share
of total intermediates usage by that industry for each EU economy in 1995
(assumed to be constant between 1993-1997),12 Ytic is real gross production,
and Mtic are NACE 2-digit real intermediate goods imports. The latter are
constructed from United Nation Broad Economic Categories at SITC 5-digit
(see Fontagné et al., 1996) and the available Correspondence Table between
9
SITC 5-digit and NACE 3-digit provided from Statistics Austria. Notewor-
thy, the constant coeﬃcient Dic does not imply that outsourcing is constant
over time. It means only that within this short time period we assume that
the distribution of a typical industry i and country c manufacturing Þrms
varying level of outsourced inputs across industries remains constant.
The speciÞcations include time dummies (λt), country dummies (ηc), and
industry dummies (µi). These time speciÞc, country speciÞc and industry
speciÞc eﬀects have also been considered in the theoretical discussion and
were subsumed under parameter ϑi above. Whereas λt controls for overall
technological improvements equal for all industries and countries, ηc and
µi account among others for persistent diﬀerences between countries in the
degree of competition induced by legislation (e.g., for mergers, market power)
and persistent industrial diﬀerences within countries (e.g., chemistry and
pharmaceutical industry versus food production). Due to the unbalancedness
of the panel, we come up with 992 observations in the econometric analysis.
We estimate four speciÞcations, which are labeled as Model 1, Model 2,
Model 3 and Model 4 below. Model 1 is the nonlinear speciÞcation of the
primary production framework, which uses contemporaneous outsourcing as
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an explanatory variable:
ln qtic = β0 + βAOtic + (r − 1) lnLtic
− (r/ρ) ln
h
δ
¡
ktice
βkOtic
¢−ρ
+ (1− δ) ¡1 + hticeβhOtic¢−ρi
+ λt + µi + ηc + εtic, (6)
where k ≡ K/L, h ≡ H/L, βk ≡ βK − βL, βh ≡ βH − βL and βA ≡ γ + rβL.
From (6) it is clear that our speciÞcation has nice properties since it allows
to distinguish between a simple shift and biased outsourcing eﬀects on
the average product of low-skilled labor. The distinction of these two eﬀects
may be especially interesting in view of the discussion on the cost-saving
and (biased) factor substitution eﬀects of international outsourcing in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model. See Egger (2002) and Egger & Falkinger (2003) for
an extensive analysis of shift and rotation of unit isocost lines in the context
of international outsourcing.13
Model 2 is similar to Model 1 but it includes lagged rather than con-
temporaneous outsourcing in order to check the possible relevance of the
endogeneity of this variable. This procedure is based on the insight that
variables that are predetermined in a model can be treated, at least asymp-
totically, as if they were exogenous in the sense that consistent estimates can
11
be obtained when they appear as regressors (Greene, 1997, p. 714). With
panel data, this requires at least some longitudinal variation in the data.
Model 2 reads:
ln qtic = β0 + βAO(t−1),ic + (r − 1) lnLtic
− (r/ρ) ln
h
δ
¡
ktice
βkO(t−1),ic
¢−ρ
+ (1− δ) ¡1 + hticeβhO(t−1),ic¢−ρi
+ λt + µi + ηc + εtic. (7)
Finally, Models 3 and 4 represent cross-sectional models, which are estimated
on the variable means (indicated by subscript . instead of t) in the time
dimension:
ln q.ic = β0 + βAO.ic + (r − 1) lnL.ic
− (r/ρ) ln
h
δ
¡
k.ice
βkO.ic
¢−ρ
+ (1− δ) ¡1 + h.iceβhO.ic¢−ρi+ ε.ic, (8)
Model 3 treats O.ic as exogenous and Model 4 takes its potential endogeneity
into account and represents a two-step nonlinear least squares estimator (see
Greene, 1997, pp. 465-472, for a discussion; Murphy & Topel, 1985, for the
asymptotic properties; and below for details on the instruments). Note that
Model 1 - Model 4 for simplicity are labeled by identical parameter letters.
There are no restrictions on parameters across equations.
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> Table 1 <
Table 1 presents the regression results for the four estimated speciÞca-
tions. In Model 1 and 2, we use 0 as the starting value for most parameters
except for r (1.2), ρ (0.5), and δ (0.5), which are motivated by previous
research on labor productivity.14 First of all, there is both neutral and non-
neutral productivity change due to outsourcing. The Þrst parameter (βA)
measures a composite of inßuences comprising a neutral technology shift ef-
fect, the impact on low-skilled labor and r. However, we also Þnd a signiÞcant
and positive relative physical capital augmenting and relative high-skilled la-
bor augmenting eﬀect of outsourcing (βk, βh > 0).15 We estimate an elasticity
of substitution of 1/(1 + ρ) ' 0.54 for eﬃciency units of capital and labor,
which is fairly low. The parameter estimate of r on the average implies de-
creasing returns to scale at the industry level (possibly due to free capacity
in the short-run). The low parameter estimate for δ reßects the fact that
we could not use information on capital services, and that the capital stock
variable represents a multiple of the required capital services. The exercise
in Model 2 gives results, which are very similar to those from Model 1. This
provides insights that the parameter estimates in Model 1 are not severely af-
fected by an endogeneity problem of the outsourcing variable, and the (short
13
term) exogeneity of outsourcing is not rejected. Therefore, we concentrate
on the results from Model 1 in what follows as long as short-run relationships
are considered.
With the parameter estimates at hand, we can investigate the marginal
eﬀect of outsourcing:
∂ ln qtic/∂Otic = βA + r
µ
δβkek−ρtic + (1− δ)βhehtic ³1 + ehtic´−ρ−1¶ /µ
δek−ρtic + (1− δ)³1 + ehtic´−ρ¶ , (9)
where ehtic ≡ hticeβhOtic and ektic ≡ kticeβkOtic are used. Evaluated at the
variable means, this eﬀect is−0.181 and indicates that a one percentage point
increase of the outsourcing intensity induces a decrease in the productivity
of low-skilled labor of about 0.2 percent.16
The usual caveats apply, since capital services are accounted for by (es-
timated) capital stocks and labor inputs are measured by employment in
heads. The former leads to a downward bias of the estimated capital coeﬃ-
cient (δ), and the latter omits the importance of the volume and the quality
of hours worked (see Jorgenson et al., 1987, and Siegel & Griliches, 1991, for
an overview on this problem). Additionally, we cannot explicitly control for
the eﬀects of R&D. As mentioned earlier, we have to rely on the assumption
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that these eﬀects are comprehensively accounted for by the Þxed eﬀects.
We follow the well-established literature on the estimation of short-run
and long-run eﬀects in static panel models (Baltagi, 2001, Pirotte, 1999).
The Þxed eﬀects estimator is associated with short-run parameter estimates
and the cross-sectional estimator approximates their long-run counterparts.17
Model 4 instruments the potentially endogenous outsourcing intensity vari-
able by (i) the average unit labor costs in the remaining EU members and
the same industry and the log of the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio as a measure of trans-
portation costs of a countrys trade (ii) in Þnal goods with the remaining EU
economies, (iii) in Þnal goods with the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries,18 (iv) in intermediate goods with the Central and Eastern European
countries. Model 3 is rejected on the basis of the Hausman (1978) test.19
Regarding the relatively small cross-sectional sample, the quality of the in-
struments is fairly well, which shows up in a canonical correlation coeﬃcient
of 0.2.
From a comparison of the parameter estimates of Model 1 with those of
Model 4 we Þnd the following main diﬀerences. First, the production of the
value added exhibits diseconomies of scale in the short-run, whereas the long-
run regression comes up with constant scale economies, given by a value of r
15
near unity in Model 4. The reason for this Þnding may be that Þrms produce
under capacity in the short-run, which can be adjusted in the long-run, or
that Þrms outsource the Þxed cost intensive part of production (especially,
the physical capital intensive one) to foreign economies. The latter may be
related to relatively high foreign direct investment. Second, the elasticity of
substitution of eﬃciency units of capital and labor is less pronounced within
industries and countries (1/(1+ ρ) ' 0.54), i.e., in the short-run, than in the
cross section (1/(1 + ρ) ' 0.62), associated with the long-run.
The marginal long-run eﬀect of narrow outsourcing from the cross-sectional
regression (Model 4, using variable means over time) is positive and amounts
to 1.813, which is much higher in absolute value as compared to its negative
short-run counterpart.
IV EXTENSION AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
The chosen approach is of course restrictive because of the strong assumption
of a CES technology in the production of value added. Hence, it is conve-
nient to relax the imposed restrictions by estimating a translog function (see
Christensen et al., 1973). To capture the idea that outsourcing changes the
eﬃciency of production factors both non-neutrally and neutrally, we can es-
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timate the following three-factor translog model in primal form:
ln qtic = β0 + β1Otic + β2Otic lnKtic + β3Otic lnHtic + β4Otic lnLtic
+ β5(Otic lnKtic)
2 + β6(Otic lnHtic)
2 + β7(Otic lnLtic)
2
+ β8(Otic lnLtic)(Otic lnKtic) + β9(Otic lnLtic)(Otic lnHtic)
+ β10(Otic lnHtic)(Otic lnKtic) + λt + µi + ηc + εtic
Table 2 summarizes the results from this regression (Model 5), which
is closest to Model 1 in Table 1. Further, we estimate the corresponding
regression on time-averaged data (the cross-sectional estimator, Model 6).
> Table 2 <
Again, we focus on the marginal eﬀect of narrow outsourcing on the pro-
ductivity of low-skilled labor and compute the marginal eﬀect on the average
productivity of low-skilled labor ∂ ln qtic/∂Otic. Similar to the CES case,
the estimate is negative for the Þxed eﬀects model and amounts to −0.412
in Model 5 (evaluated at variable means). Hence, the marginal eﬀect is
stronger under the translog speciÞcation than under the CES speciÞcation.
The translog cross-sectional estimate of the marginal eﬀect is positive, sim-
ilar to the cross-sectional estimates in the CES case. It amounts to 1.176,
which is somewhat smaller than under the CES technology assumption.
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In qualitative terms, the results from the more ßexible translog speciÞca-
tion conÞrm the earlier insights from the more restrictive CES speciÞcation.
However, the adjusted R2 is remarkably higher for the CES models (com-
pare Model 5 with Model 1 and Model 6 with Model 3). Therefore, we use
these estimates in the subsequent analysis. Overall, the results seem plausi-
ble from a theoretical point of view, and the diﬀerence in sign between the
short-run (approximated by the Þxed eﬀects models) and the long-run eﬀects
(approximated by the cross-sectional estimates) may stem from the following
sources.
(i) Outsourcing shifts part of production to foreign economies. First, for
a given factor employment and without any changes in the employment of
physical and human capital, this implies a decline in low-skilled labor produc-
tivity. Second, due to decreasing returns to scale (at least in the short-run)
at the industry level, a decline in the value added Q for a given outsourcing
intensity results in an increase in the average product of low-skilled labor. In
general, it seems to be plausible that the direct level eﬀect of outsourcing is
stronger than the indirect economies of scale eﬀect, so that the overall impact
of the production shift on the average product of low-skilled labor is nega-
tive. Moreover, the gain from international outsourcing has also its costs in
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terms of physical and human capital resources, associated with foreign direct
investment and coordination activities, respectively.20 For a given amount of
low-skilled labor employment, a decline in the stock of capital used for the
value added production process (induced by foreign direct investment), has
a negative impact on the low-skilled labor productivity. Using high-skilled
labor for coordination activities rather than in the production of the value
added does not have a direct impact on the amount of high-skilled labor
counted in the value added process, but reduces the value added Q for a
given low-skilled labor employment. This implies a further negative impact
on the low-skilled labor productivity.
(ii) By maximizing their proÞts, Þrms want to adjust their factor em-
ployment. Whereas imperfections on human and physical capital markets
are rather negligible, rigid markets for low-skilled labor in Europe are often
mentioned to be responsible for adjustment delays. In the short-run, trade
unions (under eﬃcient bargaining), legal regulation (protection against dis-
missal) or social pressure prohibit perfect adjustment of labor employment,
explaining the negative impact of international outsourcing on the low-skilled
labor productivity. In the long-run, employment adjustments (due to higher
fall-back proÞts of Þrms and lower fall-back income of workers in the bar-
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gain, due to the natural quit rate, etc.) can explain a positive impact of
international outsourcing on the average product of low-skilled labor.
(iii) The diﬀerence between the short-run and the long-run eﬀects of in-
ternational outsourcing may be magniÞed by product market imperfections.
If international outsourcing has a cost reducing eﬀect, product market im-
perfections may, Þrst, retard the output shift within one industry from Þrms
producing in an integrated way to Þrms making use of outsourcing oppor-
tunities. Second, there may also be some delay in the adjustment of the
output structure across sectors from those with relatively little advantage of
international outsourcing to those with a high cost saving eﬀect.
Taking into account (i)-(iii) it seems plausible from a theoretical point of
view that the marginal eﬀect of the outsourcing intensity on the productivity
of low-skilled labor exhibits a diﬀerent sign in the short-run and the long-run.
In addition to the marginal eﬀect of outsourcing on the average pro-
ductivity of low-skilled labor, the eﬀect on the marginal productivity of
high-skilled relative to low-skilled labor is of interest, given the extensive
discussion on the relationship between globalization and wage inequality.
In our CES case, we obtain (∂Qtic/∂Htic)/ (∂Qtic/∂Ltic) = eβhOtic so that
∂[(∂Qtic/∂Htic)/(∂Qtic/∂Ltic)]/∂Otic = βhe
βhOtic.21 Evaluated at the mean,
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this marginal eﬀect is 0.746 in the Þxed eﬀects model and 0.016 in the cross-
sectional model. Hence, outsourcing of the EU economies induces a skill-
biased eﬀect similar to outsourcing of the U.S. (see Feenstra and Hanson,
1999). In a competitive economy, the increase in marginal productivity of
high-skilled relative to low-skilled labor immediately leads to an increase in
the high-skilled to low-skilled wage ratio.22 The diﬀerent sizes of the long-run
and short-run eﬀects have to be interpreted with care. Although the afore-
mentioned results indicate that wage eﬀects may be of lower relevance in the
long-run, there may be adverse employment eﬀects in unionized European
labor markets when Þrms respond to changes in outsourcing opportunities.
V SIMULATING THE OUTSOURCING EFFECT ON THE
AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY OF LOW-SKILLED LABOR
Since the marginal eﬀect varies over time, countries and industries in the
Þxed eﬀects regression and over countries and industries in the cross-sectional
model, it seems appropriate to undertake some simulations in order to quan-
tify the importance of outsourcing for diﬀerent industries at least in the pe-
riod under consideration. In an experiment of thought, we take into account
the parameter estimates of the CES-speciÞcation (Models 1 and 4, respec-
21
tively) and derive predictions from our model assuming that the outsourcing
intensity (Otic) were constant since 1993. Over the period of 1993-1997, the
observed real value added per low-skilled worker grew by 9.3% p.a. in the
average country, manufacturing industry and year.
> Table 3 <
Table 3 provides more details on industry speciÞc growth rates. The out-
sourcing intensity (Otic) grew by 3.2% on average. With growth rates of 7%
and higher, the outsourcing intensity grew particularly fast in the Manufac-
ture of textiles, the Manufacture of wearing apparel and the Tanning and
dressing of leather industries. Also that one in the Manufacture of medical,
precision and optical instruments grew at almost 10%. In a few industries,
the outsourcing intensity declined. SpeciÞcally, the Manufacture of furniture,
the Manufacture of wood and products of wood, and the Manufacture of of-
Þce machinery and computers industries with outsourcing intensity growth
rates of in between −4% and −8.5% could be mentioned.
Assuming a constant Otic in the thought experiment means to focus on
a situation, where real intermediate imports and real production grew with
the same annual rate. The last two columns of Table 3 present the diﬀer-
ence between the model prediction for observed outsourcing growth and the
22
thought experiment with zero outsourcing intensity growth since 1993 for
both the Þxed eﬀects (short-run) and the cross-sectional regression (long-
run). According to our econometric results, in the short-run the increase in
the outsourcing intensity has lowered the average annual change in real value
added per low-skilled worker by about 1.4% in the average industry, indicat-
ing that the short-run marginal eﬀect of outsourcing is negative throughout
the sample. In contrast, the long-run stimulus caused by the change in the
outsourcing intensity is positive and amounts to about 6.0% measured in
terms of the model prediction due to observed outsourcing. In accordance
with our priors, this eﬀect is highest in the Paper and Basic metals industries
but, less expected, also in the Radio, television and communication equip-
ment industries. This result shows that international outsourcing aﬀects the
low-skilled labor productivity in low-tech as well as in high-tech industries.
VI CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents Þrst insights into the role of international outsourcing
on the productivity of low-skilled workers in EU manufacturing. Because of
its reliability, we follow Feenstra & Hanson (1999) in using a conceptually
narrow measure of the cross-border fragmentation phenomenon. According
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to the unavailability of data on skill-speciÞc factor rewards, we estimate a
nested CES primary production function approach for 12 EU countries and 22
NACE 2-digit industries over the period 1992-1997. Our short-run evidence
is inconsistent with the long-run Þndings by Feenstra & Hanson (1999) for the
US economy, since outsourcing seems to exert a signiÞcant, negative marginal
eﬀect on real value added per low-skilled worker. However, to some extent
this coincides with a similar but insigniÞcant Þnding by Siegel & Griliches
(1991, for the US as well). In contrast, our long-run parameter estimates
reveal a positive impact of outsourcing on real value added per low-skilled
worker, which supports Feenstra & Hansons (1999) Þnding and generally Þts
well into the literature on the productivity eﬀects of outsourcing. There is
evidence that international outsourcing augments physical capital and high-
skilled labor (both relative to low-skilled labor) to roughly the same extent
in the short-run as well as the long-run.
For our sample of countries and the underlying level of aggregation, no
data on skill-speciÞc factor rewards, hours per worker and the actual capital
services are available. Therefore, we have to rely on employment Þgures and
estimates of the capital stocks as our controls. This might have some im-
pact on the results. Our preliminary Þndings suggest that low-skilled labor
24
productivity growth in European manufacturing - besides unobserved inßu-
ences - in the short-run was mainly induced by the change in physical capital
stocks and skill-upgrading rather than fragmentation of production across
borders. But the impact of international outsourcing becomes important in
the long-run. Future research - especially at the Þrm level - could help to
provide deeper insights into the role of outsourcing on productivity.
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NOTES
1We would like to thank Michael Pfaﬀermayr and two anonymous referees for
helpful comments and suggestions.
2For a theoretical treatment of international outsourcing see among oth-
ers Arndt (1997), Deardorﬀ (2001), Feenstra & Hanson (1996), Egger (2002),
Egger & Falkinger (2003), Jones (2000), Jones & Kierzkowski (2001), Kohler
(2001) and Venables (1999). Egger & Egger (2001) investigate both theo-
retically and empirically the impact of international outsourcing on the skill
intensity in production.
3For an assessment of the impact of international outsourcing on Eastern
European wages see Egger & Egger (2002). Egger & Egger (2003) investi-
gate the impact of outsourcing to Central and Eastern European countries on
relative employment of high-skilled and low-skilled labor in Austrian manu-
facturing industries.
4We do not normally think of, say, the import of steel by a U.S. automo-
bile producer as outsourcing. But it is common to consider the purchase of
automobile parts by that company as outsourcing, especially if the parts were
formerly made by the same company, or at least purchased in the United
States. (Feenstra & Hanson, 1999, p. 924)
33
5In terms of the adjusted R2, the translog model performs worse for our
data. Krusell et al. (1997) stress the advantages of a CES production function
as compared to a translog speciÞcation.
6Assuming a homogeneous production function is in line with the the-
oretical literature dealing with international outsourcing in the orthodox
Heckscher-Ohlin model. (Compare among others Arndt, 1997; Deardorﬀ,
2001; Jones, 2000; Egger, 2002; Egger & Egger, 2001.) Feenstra & Hean-
son (1996) consider a three factors model and assume that capital and labor
substitute in a Cobb-Douglas production function at the intermediate goods
level. Final assembly is also formalized as a Cobb-Douglas technology. How-
ever, in favor of a more general speciÞcation we decided for a CES-production
function.
7According to the availability of data, we have to assume that the eﬀect
of Dji is comprehensively accounted for by Ai.
8See Griliches (1998) for a similar approach when estimating the produc-
tivity eﬀects of R&D.
9Feenstra & Hanson (1996) do not allow for any substitution of the two
types of labor. Krusell et al. (1997) emphasize that the elasticity of substi-
tution between skilled labor and unskilled labor is higher than the elasticity
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of substitution between skilled labor and capital. However, this is not a con-
tradiction to our assumption of perfect substitution between eﬃciency units
of the two types of labor. The advantage of our approach is stressed in the
discussion below equation (6).
10Compare Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 54) for a similar formulation
of eﬃciency units of capital and labor but outside the context of outsourcing.
11This is similar to Leamer (1984), who suggests a rate of 13% at the
aggregate country level.
12This is the share of intermediates in total intermediate usage, which
stems from producers of the same industry classiÞcation. Without any doubt,
our measure is wider than Feenstra & Hansons (1999), since the lowest level
of aggregation of European data is 2-digit rather than 4-digit. However, we
call the measure narrow, since we focus on outsourcing of goods production
within the same 2-digit industry. This is conceptually equivalent to Feenstra
& Hanson (1999).
13The discussion on the factor bias and sector bias of international out-
sourcing (compare Kohler, 2001; for an overview) is also related to the
shift and rotation of isocost lines as explored in Egger (2002) and Egger
& Falkinger (2003).
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14However, we Þnd that the present models face excellent convergence
properties. Especially, the parameter estimates for βA, βk, and βh are not
sensitive to the choice of parameter values, even in terms of their sign.
15Unfortunately, we cannot control for other sources of skill and capital
upgrading. However, given the short time period, the time variance of alter-
native inßuences should be rather small.
16Using 4-digit industry data, Siegel &Griliches (1991) Þnd that productiv-
ity growth in US manufacturing was negatively (but insigniÞcantly) related
to the change in the share of imported materials. However, the latter is only
a broad measure of outsourcing as compared to the narrow one used in the
present paper. This result seems also consistent with the Þnding from a lin-
earized speciÞcation of Model 1. The results from the Taylor approximated
models are not presented for the sake of brevity. However, they are available
upon request from the authors.
17Pirotte (1999) demonstrates that the cross-sectional estimates are close
to the long run eﬀects also for Þxed time and large cross-sectional dimension.
This is especially a useful result, if the time dimension is too short in order
to estimate a dynamic model, which is the case in our application.
18Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
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Romania, Slovenia and Slovak Republic.
19The corresponding test statistic amounts to 32.29 and is distributed as
χ2(7).
20For a discussion of resource requirements for international outsourcing
compare for example Jones & Kierzkowski (2001) and Glass & Saggi (2001).
21We make use of (∂ lnQtic/∂ lnHtic) / (∂ lnQtic/∂ lnLtic)
= htic [(∂Qtic/∂Htic) / (∂Qtic/∂Ltic)], which motivates to look at the ratio
of marginal products instead of the ratio of the respective elasticities.
22Even in the presence of trade unions, workers earn their marginal product
as long as Þrms have the right-to-manage employment (e.g. Layard and
Nickell, 1990).
37
Regression Results for CES-Specification
Dependent Variable is Real Value Added per Low-skilled Employee
Parametersa) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 e)
βA -0,605 **) -0,613 **) -0,014 ***) -0,012 ***)
(0,250) (0,261) (0,004) (0,005)
βk 0,703 **) 0,704 **) 0,021 ***) 0,015 *)
(0,287) (0,300) (0,006) (0,008)
βh 0,704 **) 0,704 **) 0,010 ***) 0,016 ***)
(0,287) (0,300) (0,002) (0,003)
δ 0,045 **) 0,040 *) 0,406 ***) 0,100
(0,020) (0,021) (0,092) (0,118)
r 0,860 ***) 0,860 ***) 0,997 ***) 0,987 ***)
(0,015) (0,017) (0,017) (0,015)
ρ 0,849 ***) 0,851 ***) 0,179 0,605 **)
(0,142) (0,167) (0,112) (0,306)
β0 0,020 0,020 -1,300 ***) -2,032 ***)
(0,177) (0,199) (0,258) (0,466)
Observations 992 755 225 225
Adjusted R2 0,935 0,934 0,885 0,900
Time Effectsb) 7,19 ***) 9,26 ***)
Country Effectsc) 36,59 ***) 29,3 ***)
Industry Effectsd) 19,70 ***) 16,07 ***)
Nonlinear Fixed Effects Nonlinear Cross-Sectional
TABLE 1
a) Standard errors in parentheses. - b) Distributed as F(5, 950) in Model 1, as F(5, 949) in Model 2, and as F(4, 713) in
Model 3. - c) Distributed as F(11, 949) in Model 1 and as F(11, 713) in Model 2.- d) Distributed as F(20, 949) in
Model 1 and as F(20, 713) in Model 2. - e) Instrumental variable regression assuming the outsourcing intensity to be
endogenous and using the following instruments: average unit labor costs in the remaining EU and the same industry,
log (c.i.f./f.o.b.) of the country and industry specific EU final goods exports, log (c.i.f./f.o.b.) of the country and
industry specific EU intermediate goods exports, log (c.i.f./f.o.b.) of the country and industry specific final goods
exports to the CEEC, log (c.i.f./f.o.b.) of the country and industry specific intermediate goods exports to the CEEC. The
associated coefficient of the canonical correlation between the endogenous variable and the set of instruments is 0.2.
*) significant at 10%; **) significant at 5%; ***) significant at 1%.
Regression Results for Translog-Specification
Dependent Variable is Real Value Added per Low-skilled Employee
Fixed Effects Between
Regressorsa) Model 5 Model 6
Outsourcing intensity: O 0,0009 0,0088 ***)
(0,0009) (0,0031)
Log physical capital: (ln K)µO 0,0002 0,0031 ***)
(0,0003) (0,0011)
Log high-skilled labor: (ln H)µO 0,0018 ***) 0,0069 ***)
(0,0003) (0,0011)
Log low-skilled labor: (ln L)µO -0,0022 ***) -0,0101 ***)
(0,0003) (0,0009)
(ln K)2µO2 -1.49x10-7 -2.52x10-7
(1.44x10 -7 ) (7.30x10 -7 )
(ln H)2µO2 1.43x10-6 ***) -1.59x10-6
(2.75x10 -7 ) (1.75x10 -6 )
(ln L)2µO2 2.34x10-6 ***) 5.41x10-7
(2.80x10 -7 ) (1.36x10 -6 )
(ln L)µ(ln K)µO2 -5.36x10-7 3.23x10-8
(3.98x10 -7 ) (2.45x10 -6 )
(ln L)µ(ln H)µO2 -3.78x10-6 ***) 1.17x10-6
(4.54x10 -7 ) (2.37x10 -6 )
(ln H)µ(ln K)µO2 6.88x10-7 6.16x10-8
(4.98x10 -7 ) (3.05x10 -6 )
Observations 992 225
Adjusted R2 0,884 0,587
Time effectsb) 4,70 ***) -
Country effectsc) 185,81 ***) -
Industry effectsd) 78,98 ***) -
TABLE 2
a) Standard errors in parentheses. - b) Distributed as F(5, 945). - c) Distributed as F(11, 945).-
d) Distributed as F(20, 945). **) significant at 5%; ***) significant at 1%.
Average Annual Growth of Outsourcing and Productivity of Low-skilled Labour in the EU
 Average Annual Change in Percent (1993-1997)
Outsourcing Productivity of 
 intensity low-skilled labour
Fixed effects Cross-sectional
NACE 2-digit industry (short-run) (long-run)
Manufacture of food products and beverages 3,15 4,94 -0,16 1,16
Manufacture of textiles 7,03 9,45 -0,14 6,31
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing; dyeing of fur 15,02 12,31 -0,03 0,32
Tanning, dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage 8,08 8,57 -0,03 -3,95
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture -7,16 10,78 -0,04 10,87
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 1,44 15,92 -0,11 22,32
Publishing, printing, reproduction of recorded media -0,83 5,66 -0,07 0,65
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel -0,62 -0,02 -0,01 14,83
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 5,28 4,00 -0,05 -1,55
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 3,74 6,91 -0,03 0,14
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 4,66 1,82 -0,05 0,85
Manufacture of basic metals 2,33 14,34 -0,10 18,11
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment -0,28 11,04 -0,11 2,29
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 1,70 17,17 -0,14 6,51
Manufacture of office machinery and computers -4,31 12,02 0,00 -0,46
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 4,31 17,66 -0,13 10,07
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 1,20 13,85 -0,04 17,38
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 9,83 6,98 -0,01 3,45
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 6,02 7,82 -0,10 11,17
Manufacture of other transport equipment 1,18 8,16 -0,01 0,24
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. -8,47 10,79 -0,05 1,78
Total manufacturing 3,22 9,28 -1,39 6,01
Predicted productivity
observed - simulateda)
TABLE 3
a) Calculated as predicted productivity due to observed outsourcing minus predicted productivity due to simulated counterfactual outsourcing in terms of the former.
